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Allen (sexuallv .,,.. ,,ll_i~~.r-dangerous) -~-r Cert to I]l. Sup. Ct. ("ioran: 
· - _ o.L others n t indicated) 
v. r~r ·- ~,_,,,,,~~7"-' ~ h; 
~/,I_. .-.-/1 j,A_,1~_.;a~.\.'- ? 
Illinois ~ /LO - .~ ,r- - ~---State/C1 v1l 'T'imelv 
1. SUMMARY: 'Petr claims that the Fifth Amendment's protec-
tion against self-incrimination should apply in I1linoi.s' pro-
---- ---------,,,---- -----~ 
ceedings to c~t petr as sexually dangerous. 
------2. :PACTS AND DEC IS IONS BELOW: Accord i nq to the victim, 
petr forced her to engage in various sexual acts with him. Crim-
inal charges were brought. 
(~l<L ~ 
• 
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The state then also petitioned to have oetr declared a "sex-
ually dangerous person" (SDP) under IJ1. Rev. Stat., ch. 39, 
para. 105--1.01 et seq. (reproduced in app. B to petn). To suc-
ceed, the state must show 
"a menta l disorder fthat] has existed for a 
period of not less than one year ... coupl ed 
with er il!!i nsl_ pro_pens ill-es to the commission 
of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated 
propensities towards acts of sexual assau l t 
or acts of sexual mo l estation of children." 
~, at 105--1. 01. . --
An SDP can be incarcerated until he or she can show, by a o r e po n-
~ - - --- - - ~- - ::,.. 
derance of the evidence, a lack of sexual dangerousness. Id., at ---------------~ 
para. 105--9 . 
At a hearing, tl-ie trial court exp1_ained to Petr the proce-
du res o f , 
represented 
and petr 's rights 
by counsel. Petr 
under, the SDP statute. Pet r was 
indj c3ted that he understood the 
"'-
nature of the proceedings. The court orde reil petr to subrni t to 
examinations by two psychiatrists. 
According to the intermediate appe1 late court, one psvch i a-
tr ist "never warned" petr that the e xami nation could be used in -------
the SDP proceeding, while the other qave no "adequate warn i nq." 
~
123 Ill. App. 3d at 671. 
After a probable cause hearing, the criminal charges were 
dismissed. --
At the trial on the charge that oetr was sexually dangerous, 
the two psychiatrists who examined petr testified. The trial 
court refused to admit their recounting of petr's statements, hut 
did allow expert opinions based on the interviews. Both 
pyschiatrists testifed that petr fulfilled the SDP criteria. ~he 
" 
• 
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victim also testified. The trial court founa petr sexually dan-
gerous. 
The Illinois intermediate appellate court reversed the c'le-
termination. It reasoned that the psvchi atr ists' test imonv im-
properlv relied upon information obtained in violation of petr's 
privilege against self-incrimination. 12 3 I 11 . App. 3d 6 69. A 
dissent argued that the proceedings were not criminal, and thus 
no Fifth Amendment privileges attached. 
'T'he Vr 11inois Supreme Court reinstated t11e determination. 
The proceedings under the S DP Act are "s j mi lar to er irni nal pro---
ceedings rbutl nonetheless essentL::illv civil in nature." ____________,. Slip 
op. in app. A to petn at 4 (discussing PeopJe v. English, 31 Ill. 
2d 3 o 1 < 1 9 6 4 ) ) . Because of the liberty interests at stake, due 
process re qui res that the proceedings show sexual dangerousness 
beyond a reasonable doubt. l?eopJe v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. ~d 117 
(1976). Nonetheless, the 2urpose of the program is t reatrnent, 
---=-----,, 
not punishment. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, para. 105--8. 'T'he Tl_-
~ --y ·.···~ . 
linois legislature has stated that the proceedings are civil. 
Ibid. 
In People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill. 2d 261 (1957), the court held 
that the state must make a preliminary showing as to the volun-
tariness of admissions sought to be intronuce11 in SDP proceed-
ings. Here, however, in-court warnings to ?etr and his represen-
tation by counsel are sufficient to show voluntariness. Slip op. 
at 6. 
~he multiple, already-exjsting safeguards would brinq little 
increased reliability to the SDP determination, while to enforce 
It 
• 
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a privilege against self-incrimination would make it much more 
difficult to identify the sexually <'langerous. Slip op. at 7-8. 
Courts must, however, exclude any testimony compelled by the psy-
chiatric examination that the state might attempt to introduce in 
criminal proceedings. See Este l le v. Smit'li, 451 rr.s. 454 (198 1 ). 
Having stated that "[vloluntariness and the sel_f-
incrimination privilege are separate issues," sJip op. at 6, the 
court noted that i. t was not reach i nq the issue of whether the 
privilege had been waived, since no privilege existed. Slip op. 
at 8. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 1n re r.ault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), requires 
Illinois to provide petr with the privileae against se]f-
i ncr imi nation in these proceedings. 
ousness result in incarceration and 
Fi ndinqs of sexuaJ. danger-
stigma, both to a negree 
greater than i.n the iuvenile proceedings involved in Gau l t. See 
United States ex rel. Stauchalak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 93J (CA7 
1975). ~he privilege against self-incrimination protects against 
unreliable confessions and state coercion. Any interest that the 
state has in protecting sod ety from the sexually dangerous can 
be served by criminal prosecution. 
Resp replies that, since the Illinois Supreme Court found 
petr's statements voluntary, petr waived any Fifth Amendment 
rights he may have had. 
In Estelle, the Court stated in dicta that no Fifth Amend-
ment issue would have arisen i.f defendant's statements had been 
used to determine competency to stand trial. 451 U.S. at 465. 
Similarly, here the aetermination is one of: mentaJ_ illness, not 
• 
• 
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guilt or innocence. In the context of determining mental health, 
concern for reliability is lessened because psychiatri.sts are as 
interested in the lies or distortions of the interviewee as they 
are in statements truthfully made. 
Illinois provides in these proceedi_ngs a panoply of rights 
also available to criminal defendants. See Ill. Rev. State., ch. 
38, paras. 105--5, 105--3.01 (right to trial by iury, to counsel, 
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt); 1?eop1e v. Nastasio, 19 
Ill .2d 524 (1960) (right to confront witnesses). Nonetheless, 
even these protections are not constitutionally required in all 
proceedings. See Addington v. Texas, 441 TJ.S. 4J8 (1979) (Proof 
in involuntarv commitment need not be beyond a reasonable doubt): 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no riqht to tria] 
bv iury in juvenile hearings). The Court shouia not require the 
proceedings to include the privilege aoainst self-incrimination, 
just as it declined to reguire the privilege in orohation oro-
ceedings. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984). 
Final]y, the Court has declined to review a "remarkablv sim-
ilar state court decision." Resp at 8. See CommonweaJtli v. 
Barboza, 438 N.E.2d 1064 (Mass.), cert. aenied, 459 U.S. 1020 
(1982). A number of states have declined to reguire a privilege 
against self-incrimination in involuntary commitment proceedings. 
See, ~ ~, Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) 
(mental illness); Cramer v. Tyars, 588 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1979) (men-
tal retardation and danger to self or others). 
Petr's reply asserts that the proceedings at issue are not 
equivalent to involuntary commitment procedures. SDPs are corn-
• 
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mitted to the Illinois Department of Corrections, not the Illi-
nois Department of Mental Health, and SDPs are generally incar-
cerated with criminal sex offenaers. The proceedings requires a 
showing not just of mental illness, but also of criminaJ propen-
sities, and past crimes are relevant thereto. 
Barboza involves a proceeding held after determination of 
criminal guilt, and incriminatory statements are inadmissible to 
determining guilt . 
In light of - the Illinois Supreme Court's ex?ress statement 
that .it did not nee<'! to reach the issue of waiver because no 
riqht existed to waive, Illinois i_s clearly going to refuse to 
recognize any Fifth Amendment privilege in the future in SDP pro-
ceedings, whether asserted or waived. 
4. DISCUSSION: In re Gault involved an aajudication of 
delinquency in connection with a phone call "of the irritatinqJ_y 
---------------
offensive, adolescent, sex variety." 387 U.S. at 4. Commitment 
to a state institution was a possible resolution of the proceed-
ing. v-: The Court held that the privilege aqainst self-
incrimination applied, id. at 43-55, both to ensure re1-iability -~ --
and to prevent the state from "overcoming the mind and wi 11 of 
the person under investigation," id., at 47. 
The fact that the iuvenile proceedings in ~ault were denomi-
nated "civil" was insufficient. More than half the states al-
lowed the transfer or Placement of juveniles in adult penal in-
sti tu ti ons. 
c----
Juvenile courts often relinquished their iurisdic-
tion to ordinary criminal courts. Id., at 49-51. 
• 
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'T'his case does not j_nvolve iuveni.les, and thus the concern 
___ . ·--·------;::::=t' 
for reliability in confessions that part l y motivated the Gault 
Court is absent. Nonetheless, the results of the SDP proceeding-
-at least if, as pet r asserts, SDPs are tvpi call y housed with 
--- - -------... ,,,. ----=-
IL • ' l \i~ ff ..:i ' • ' 1 h 1 f cr1m1na sex o en,.1ers--are ou1te s1m1 ar to t e resu _ ts o a --~ 
criminal tria l . In addition, explicit consideration of cr i minal-
ity is necessary to make an SDP determination. 
Minnesota v. Murphy held that a meeting wj th a orohation 
of 'f'i cer nid not, in light of the dissimilarity of the interv i ew 
to police custody and the relativelv uncompelling nature of a 
threat to revoke parole, give rise to a self-executing -P i fth 
Amendment privilege. 104 S. Ct. at 1143-11_47. In light of these 
factors, the defendant's failure to assert the priv i lege made the 
statements admissible. See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242 (1980) (fine of up to $5000 not criminal, especially in light 
of other punishments in statute expressly labelled as criminal)~ 
Baxter v. Pa l migiano, 425 U.S. 308, ·n6-320 (1976) (Fifth Amend-
ment privilege does not apply to orison disciplinary oroceed -
i ngs) • 
In this case, the ' f ntervi.ewi (.__ at issue occurred well after 
petr had been placed in custody, and were compe l led by an order -------------~ 
of the court. The punishment is incarceration, not a fine or 
- -- -
forfeiture of in-prison privileges. 
The ~A7 in Coughlin held that the Constitution reauired the 
application of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to Illi-
nois' SDP proceedings. The opinion relied on In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358 (1970). In Winship, the Court required proof beyond a 
• 
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reasonable doubt in adjudications of juvenile delinquency for 
actions which would be criminal if performed by an adult. I note 
that ~ ge Stevens ioined Coughy in " (without separate opin-
ion).\~ ~--------The court aeclined to require such a ri.gorous standard of 
proof in adj ud ica ti ons of mental illness leading to commitment. 
Addington v. Texas ("clear and con vi nci ng evidence" standard is 
sufficient to satisfy due process). ~he possibility of incarcer---- ----------ation with conventional criminals and the consideration jn the 
-C.--::_ - - - . "":- '--- -c~-~ 
proceeding of er imi nal i tv would seem reasonable grounds on which 
to distinguish commitment of the mental l y i 11 from an S DP pro-
ceeding. 
Estel le v. Smith involved the use of. psvch i atr i c testimony 
in the sentencing phase of a capita 1 case, and held that the 
Fi.fth Amendment privilege applied to such statements. The fact 
that the proceedings there were obvi.ously criminal makes Estelle 
of limited use here. 
Barboza involved a determination of sexual 0angerousness 
made during the indivinua1 's criminal i.mpri_sonment for a sexual 
offense. The i ndi vi dual had been warned by the psychi atr i.sts 
involved that their conversations with him were unprivileged. 
The "voluntariness" of petr's statements leaves open the 
possibility that petr wai_ved his Fifth Amendment rights. None-
theless, although the Illinois Supreme Court may be drawing a 
fine line in distingui.shing "voluntariness" from "waiver," its 
explicit statement that it was not considerinq waiver because 
there was no right to waive would seem to foreclose this ~ourt's 
- - 9 - -
ability to assume the outcome miqht be nifferent in a case where 
there was c l early no waiver. 
In summarv, I th i nk the SDP proceed i ngs are verv close to 
~ 
er imi nal' proceedings, and thus that the Illinois Supreme ~ourt ~-
may have misapplied Gault in rul.ing that no Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege existed. The particularly sa l ient reliability concerns 
that accompany juvenile confessions are absent here, however. 
---------------This absence would give the Court a chance to speak to the rela-
tive weights to be accorded reliabi1ity and similarity to crimi-
nal proceedings, the other jmportant factor in Gault. 
If the SDP proceedings are not functionallY equivalent to 
criminal proceedings, the case gives the Court the chance to con-
sider whether due process requires granting a privilege against 
self-incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. The facts of 
this case would allow the Court, in making this netermination, to 
consider whether the ava i lability of a number of other procedural 
safeguards in a commitment proceeding might make unnecessary a 
privilege against self-incr imi nation. ~ f. r.,:at hews v. Eldr i_ dge, 
424 U. s. at 335 (allowing consideration of "probable va l ue, if 
any, of add i ti ona 1 or substitute procedural safeguards" in cli s-
a bi li ty determinations). 
~he Psychiatric examinations occurred while the criminal 
charges were still pending. Although there is no indication in -
the appellate opinions that this examination was to determine 
competency to stand trial in addition to providing evidence on 
sexual dangerousness, the timing of the exam makes such a dua l 
f unction conceivable . A dual competency/dangerousness exarnina-
7 
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tion would raise somewhat different questions than those raisea 
by a straightforward examination for dangerousness. I therefore 
recommend a call for the record to make sure the examinations 
were conducted only as part of the SDP proceeding. 
IFP status is proper. 
I recommend calling for the record with an eve towards a 
grant. 
~here is a response. 
Oct o be r 18 , 1 9 8 5 Setear opn i n petn 
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April 15, 1986 
ALLEN GINA-POW 
85-5404 Allen v. Illinois 
MEMO TO BILL: 
This case involves the validity of a curious Illinois 
statute applicable to "sexual dangerous persons". The 
statute defines a "sexual dangerous person" as one 
"suffering from a mental disorder" for more than a year, 
"coupled with er iminal propensities to the commission of 
sex offenses, and who has demonstrated propensities toward 
acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of 
children." Illinois courts have construed this statute to 
- than proof of mere "propensity" ;~ rather, the 
state must - rove that the defendant "demonstrated~ this 
propensity. In other words, the state must prove at least 
one act of sexual assault or molestation. 
In this case petitioner had been charged by the state 
with the er ime of deviate sexual assault. Apparently, 
deciding not to try petitioner for the er ime, the state 
filed this petition to declare him a sexual dangerous 
person. If a person is found to be a sexual dangerous 
person, he is confined in a special mental health facility 
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limitation on the period of confinement, the Attorney 
General's brief states that "regular progress evaluations 
---- ;? 
[are made] until recovery is achieved." Br. p. 6. Under 
Illinois law the proceeding that results in this 
confinement is "civil" and not criminal. Indeed, when the 
state filed its petition under the "sexual dangerous 
person" statute, it dismissed the criminal charge against 
petitioner. 
Despite the "civil" purpose of psychiatric treatment, 
the proceedings that result in confinement resemble in 
many ways a criminal trial. VCounsel is provided, there is 
{J;a right to v jury trial~ roof must be beyond a reasonable 
d~btl and there is ~ ght to confront witnesses. See 
opinion of Illinois court, App. 48. 
This case involves two safeguards available to a -----------
per son charged with •~rime' that are not available in this 
~
type of proceeding: ( i) Miranda warnings are not 
~
required before the defendant is examined by a 
psychiatrist pursuant to court order; and (ii) the 
privilege against self-incrimination is not thought to be 
applicable because of the civil nature of the proceedings. ----The validity of these differences is the question 
presented to us. 
- - 3. 
The factual situation in which the question arises 
involve the testimony of two psychiatrists who examined 
petitioner prior to trial without Miranda warnings. 
Counsel had been appointed, but it is not clear - at least 
---------II do not recall - whether counsel had been appointed at that time and could have been present. Both 
psychiatrists' testimony was based almost entirely upon 
~"'' petitioner's "statements and admissions made during these 
''$I-'-'% interviews", App, p, 42, fflhe TC ruled, however, that 
,,.., 1:' ~ ~;itioner • s statements were not admissible in evidence, 
• 
';,t· yv""' ~ but allowed the physicians to give their professional 




, ~~ was mentally ill with criminal propensities to commit sex 
~ YI,, -=-- ... 
Both psychiatrists concluded that defendant 
,~ crimes. 
jA ✓ Petitioner's brief by the state public defender is 
well-written, and an amicus brief by my former clerk Joel 
Klein for the American Psychiatric Association also 
-----, 
strongly supports petitioner. I am not entirely 
persuaded, however, that either of these briefs presents 
as fully and fairly the holding and rationale of the 
Illinois Supreme Court as they could have. Yet, this is 
• 
• 
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not unusual in advocacy (although my personal view is that 
it may be self-defeating, depending on a question of 
degree). 
In brief summary, petitioner argues that the statute 
at issue exposes the defendant to consequences that are 
potentially more severe than those of a er iminal 
conviction because the period of confinement is unlimited. 
This statute, in effect, compels a defendant to provide 
information to psychiatrists that can lead to indefinite 
confinement. There will have been no more Miranda 
warnings, with the result that a defendant may be 
compelled to incriminate himself, contrary to the Fifth 
Amendment 
arguments. 
privilege. These are not insubstantial 
The brief of the Attorney General, however, is one of 
the better briefs that come to us from the Offices of 
State Attorney's. I refer you, Bill, to the summary 
argument that presents quite a different picture from 
v~ petitioner's briefs. It is argued that <Z?roof of a 
~ ~ respondent's mental disorder,~ ismissal of the pending 
Jr- ~ . n criminal charge, an~ e penalty of being confined only 
~ • UL -
for psychiatric care, distinguish this proceeding from 
the er iminal trial for which the privilege was designed. 
~LL+>~~~~~ 
lJ"n.. HM- IU4 ~ C '2..U- tyl.Vl..l ... ~). 
0 -1-a-,-JJ<- lA-\.,~+- VJ.._ ~1-~1-t_.,~ I 
m,~~~k- ~ 
vJ_ '~
11i  HJ ~~~<7-;:r" 
• 
• 
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Full protection of the respondent's Fifth Amendment is 
provided by the immunity from subsequent criminal 
prosecution that Illinois law provides. Reliance also is 
placed on the clear legislative intent to create a civil, 
mental health commitment as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the 
state has a "substantial interest" in treating sexually 
dangerous persons as well as in protecting the public from 
----- - ---..._--....___---- ------ ---------such persons. Moreover, according to the Illinois Supreme 
Court this "interest would be almost totally throttled by 
a strict application of the i.-~elf-incrimination privilege 1.1. 
in such a proceeding. If a defendant is allowed to refuse 
to answer questions asked during the psychiatric 
interview, then it would be nearly impossible for the 
state to determine whether or not the defendant was 
sexually dangerous." App. 48. 
* * * 
I find this a rather close case. I am inclined to 
think, at least for the present, that the state has the 
better argument. There is a clear state interest in 
providing psychiatric care for persons like petitioner, 








To: Justice Powell April 29, 1986 
From: Bill 
Re: Allen v. Illinois, No. 85-5404 
Cert to Illinois Supreme Court 
Argument date: April 30, 1986 (Wednesday) 
Questions Presented 
1. Does the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination apply to a proceeding to commit sexually dangerous 
persons to a prison hospital? 
2. If so, must a psychiatrist give a defendant Miranda 
warnings prior to conducting any pretrial examination pursuant to 
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[Your memo to the file accurately summarizes the facts; I 
won't repeat them here.] 
Discussiy ·t- _) 
I find this a close case. My own view is that the --privilege against self-incrimination probably does not apply 
here, but that view is tentative, and could change based on oral 
argument. If you conclude that the privilege does apply, the 
second issue--whether or not Miranda warnings are required--is 
virtually governed by ~ v. -Smi t-h,, 
~
451 u.s. 454 (1981). 
Estelle held that Miranda warnings are required in a psychiatric 
examination where the psychiatrist testifies against the 
defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding. Estelle strongly 
suggests that Miranda applies to psychiatric examinations and 
--- -~ " 
police interrogation equally, so long as the examination takes 
place in the context of a "criminal" proceeding. 
for me 
I'll begin by discussing 
is the diffic~ one. 
Miranda issue. 
I'll 





1. The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be 
I \ l 
compelled in any ~ riminal case to be a witness against himself." 
It has long been clear that the privilege against self-
incrimination protects against questioning outside the courtroom, 
e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966), but only insofar as 
the statements might be used in a criminal prosecution. Thus, 
• 
• 
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the threshold issue in this case is whether a proceeding under 
Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act is a criminal 
prosecution for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
The starting point in addressing that issue is the label 
the state places on the proceeding. The Act itself states that 
"proceedings under this Act shall be civil in nature." Ill. Rev. 
Stat. ch. 38, §105-3.01. 1 Consequently, in order to find the 
Fifth Amendment applicable here, the Court must find that the Act 
is "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the 
legislature's] intention" that it be construed as civil rather 
than criminal. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). 
"' [O]nly the clearest proof could suffice'" to show that a 
regulatory statute labelled civil is in fact criminal for Fifth 
Amendment purposes. Ibid., quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 
603, 617 (1960). In short, there is a strong presumption that a 
punishment labelled "civil" by the legislature is what it says, 
'--- "---
and consequently that the privilege against self-incrimination 
does not apply. The Court has listed a number of factors to use 
in deciding whether that presumption may be overcome. 2 But the 
1A copy of the Act appears in the appendix to petr 's 
brief, pp. la-4a. 
2In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the 
Court looked to whether the sanction being imposed (1) 
involved a disability or restraint (i.e. confinement), (2) 
has historically been considered to be punishment, (3) is 
applied only after the defendant's intent has been proved, 
( 4) promotes retribution and deterrence, ( 5) applies to 
conduct already considered er iminal, ( 6) can be ascribed 
to some purpose other than punishment, and (7) is 
excessive in relation to any non-punitive purpose. Id., 
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point of all these factors, Ward makes clear, is to determine 
whether the purpose of the sanction is punitive. 
249-250. 
448 u.s., at 
2. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court found 
that a juvenile delinquency proceeding was sufficiently criminal 
to justify applying the privilege against self-incrimination. 
The key factors in Gault included (1) the stigma that attached to 
convicted juvenile offenders, id., at 23-24, and (2) the fact 
that juvenile offenders could be sentenced to serve time in adult 
prisons. Id., at 49-50. These factors showed that the reality 
of punishment in juvenile proceedings was no different than 
ordinary criminal sentencing. The fact that juveniles could be 
sent to the same prisons as their adult counterparts belied the 
legislature's supposedly non-punitive intent to "treat" juvenile 
offenders rather than punish them. Ibid. See Developments in the 
Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 
1305 (1974). 
Gault cuts in both directions in this case. On the one 
hand, unlike Gault, this case involves commitment to a hospital 
and not a jail. 3 The Act requires the Corrections department to 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
point of all these factors was to discern whether the 
statute in question was intended to be punitive. 448 
u.s., at 249-250. 
3Petr and amici make much of the fact that the hospital 
is administered by the Illinois Department of Corrections. 
I don't see why this matters. The critical point about 
incarceration is not what agency administers it, but 
whether its character is punitive or not. 
• 
• 
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"provide care and 
effect recovery." 
treatment for the person committed 
§105-8 (quoted App to petr's brief 3a). 
to 
This 
language has been read to confer a right to be assigned to a 
place at which psychiatric care is available. People v. Shiro, 
5 2 I 11 . 2d 2 7 9 , 2 8 3 ( 19 7 2) . The institution to which sexually 
dangerous persons are sent, the Menard Psychiatric Center, is not 
part of any prison. Moreover, sexually dangerous persons may not 
be transferred to another facility. 4 Thus, the state can 
plausibly maintain that petr 's disposition is more consistent 
with treatment than with punishment. See Addington v. Texas, 441 
u.s. 418, 428 (1979) ("In a civil commitment state power is not 
exercised in a punitive sense"). That was not the case in Gault. 
On the other hand, Gault also emphasized the stigma that 
attached to juvenile delinquent status. 387 U.S., at 23-24, 49. 
I 
In this case, the Illinois Act requires proof of a "demonstrated 
propensity" to commit either sexual assault or child molestation. 
§105-1.01 (quoted App to Petr's Brief la). Consequently, in 
order to confine petr under the Act, the state must prove that 
4on the other hand, Menard Psychiatric Center does 
contain, according to petr, a large number of convicted 
criminals referred there for treatment. See Brief for 
Petr 15, n. 3. If true (and resp doesn't directly 
contradict this assertion), this gives petr a fair 
argument that sexually dangerous persons are treated the 
same as criminals, since they are sent to a facility that 
houses a large number of convicted criminals. 
I don't think that argument works, however, because 
I think the critical factor is whether the state is giving 
petr treatment rather than punishment. The fact that some 
er iminally insane are also at Menard may only show that 
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petr has committed acts that constitute sex crimes in Illinois. 5 
Confinement thus labels petr as a rapist or child molester--a 
fairly severe stigma if ever there was one. If stigma alone is 
justification for applying the privilege against self-
incrimination, then the privilege ought to be applied here. 
I think there are two answers to this argument. First, 
the state often imposes both civil and criminal penalties for the 
same conduct. United States v. ward, 448 u.s., at 250; Helvering 
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). It doesn't follow that 
the civil penalties are therefore essentially "criminal"; rather, 
the touchstone remains whether the legislature intended to impose 
an essentially er iminal punishment. Ward, supra, at 250-251. 
Second, there is an obviously strong stigma to being labelled 
mentally ill in any civil commitment case. Nevertheless, in 
Addington v. Texas the Court rejected the argument that such 
stigma makes civil commitment proceedings the equivalent of 
criminal trials. The Court emphasized that erroneous confinement 
for mental illness was more easily corrected than erroneous 
imprisonment for a crime, 441 u.s., at 428-429; in addition, the 
Court noted that those who are not committed, but should be, 
5The state responds to this point by noting that it does 
not need to prove any criminal intent in order to confine 
someone as a sexually dangerous person. That is correct, 
so far as it goes, but I don't think it matters much in 
this context: it's hard to conceive of unintentional 
child molestation or accidental sexual assault. The 
offenses themselves are almost inherently intentional (cf. 
Rose v. Clark, 84-1974), so that proof of the conduct 
amounts to proof of the completed crime. 
• 
• 
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suffer a stigma as well. Id., at 429 ("One who is suffering from 
a debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither 
wholly at liberty nor free of stigma."}. These points apply to 
persons suffering from illnesses that compel them to assault 
women or children as well as to persons with other emotional or 
mental diseases. 
3. My tentative conclusion is that Gault is 
distinguishable, and that the privilege should not apply here. 
The practical stigma for people like petr is likely to be 
tremendous. But given the Court's analysis of civil commitment 
proceedings and the associated stigma in Addington, I think that 
isn't enough to render this proceeding "criminal." As for the 
kind of sanction that is imposed, in Gault it was fundamentally 
punitive in nature. Here, the statute at issue, as construed by 
Illinois cases, requires psychiatric treatment in a facility 
designed for that purpose. 
4. Petr emphasizes a number of other factors that 
proceedings under the Illinois Act share in common with criminal 
trials. In particular, petr notes that the state must prove that 
would-be committees fall within the Act beyond a reasonable 
doubt--the same burden of proof as in criminal cases. Petr also 
emphasizes that proceedings under the Act are begun by formal 
charges by criminal prosecutors, and are only brought after 
er iminal charges have been brought. (The er iminal charges are 
dropped once the defendant is determined to be a sexually 
• 
• 
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dangerous person.) Petr argues that these factors suggest that 
the Act is nothing more than an alternative means of er iminal 
punishment for rapists and child molesters. 
I find this line of argument unpersuasive. Nothing in the 
Constitution requires the state to civilly commit all persons 
with sex-related disease; the state can rationally decide that it 
should confine only those who have manifested their illness in 
some destructive way. Once it makes that decision, the most 
logical way to identify such people is to examine those who are 
charged with sex er imes. I see nothing sinister in such an 
approach. Nor does it seem strange that the state requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt in these cases. States should be 
commended, not criticized, for providing more process than is 
constitutionally necessary. 
5. For these reasons, I would conclude that the privilege 
against self-incrimination does not apply here. The evident 
purpose of the Illinois Act is to provide treatment for people 
whose illnesses cause them to commit sex er imes. That purpose 
distinguishes this case from Gault, and suggests that the Act 
cannot be considered criminal under Ward. Moreover, that purpose 
might well be thwarted if defendants were able to refuse to be 
examined by psychiatrists. 
II. Necessity of Miranda Warnings 
If you conclude otherwise, you must reach the question 
whether Miranda warnings are required in this context. I think 
t 
• 
- - 9. 
this issue is governed by Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 {1981). 
Estelle was a capital case in which the TC ordered the defendant 
examined by a psychiatrist to determine whether he was competent 
to stand trial. The defendant was found competent, and was 
convicted of capital murder. At his sentencing hearing, the 
psychiatrist testified against him, emphasizing the defendant's 
lack of remorse for the killing. The Court held that the 
psychiatrist had been obliged to give Miranda warnings in this 
context. Id., at 466-469. The Court specifically rejected the 
argument that Miranda was limited to police interrogation, and 
did not apply to a medical examination. Id., at 467. 
If you determine that the proceeding in this case is 
criminal, I see no basis for distinguishing Estelle. As in that 
case, petr's statements to the psychiatrist were used against him 
in a "criminal" proceeding. And there is no suggestion in 
Estelle that its rule applies only to capital cases. I would 
therefore conclude that Miranda applies in this case, if you 
first conclude that the proceeding under the Illinois Act is 
criminal for Fifth Amendment purposes. 
Conclusions 
1. I tentatively recommend affirmance. Although it's a 
close case, I would conclude that the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply where the state seeks only to impose 
------
treatment rather than criminal_punishment. -----2. If you disagree, I would conclude that Miranda applies 
... - - 10 • 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: May 1, 1986 
RE: Allen v. Illinois, No. 85-5404 
You asked for a short summary of my position in 
this case; that summary follows. 
1. The Fifth Amendment ap:Qlies here only if the 
----------. - ~ 
sexually dangerous persons proceeding is "criminal." The - --
Illinois legislature expressly classified this statute as 
civil, not criminal. That classification is entitled to 
substantial weight, United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
249-250 (1980), and 
of 
can be disregarded _9.!llY if the 
statute's scheme punishment is functionally no 
different from criminal punishment. In this case, it 
~
isn't. As a matter of Illinois law, petr has a legal 
right to psychiatric treatment, and he is being sent to a 
facility designed to provide such treatment. He is free 
to apply for release at any time, and if his doctors find 
t 
2. 
that he is no longer dangerous, he will be let out. This 
kind of "sentence" is not criminal in nature, because it 
neither punishes nor deters--sexually dangerous persons 
may be released after only a very short time in the 
hospital, and on average they are released after only 
about 2 years. 
2. It is true that sexually dangerous persons are 
confined in cells with bars, and are not "free to leave," 
as Justice Marshall noted at oral argument. But all 
persons who are civilly committed against their will are 
deprived of liberty. Nevertheless, in Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Court made clear that civil 
commitment is not the same as criminal punishment, since 
those committed receive treatment rather than punishment. 
I would so conclude in this case as well, and would 
therefore affirm the Illinois Supreme Court. 
- • Ko. 85-5404 Allen v. Illinois Conf. 5/2/86 
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Dear Chief: 
My tentative vote in this case is to affirm. 
-· Sincerely, 
s ~ 
Sandra D. O'Connor 
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· 1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. g5.:..5404 
TERRY B. ALLEN, PETITIONER v. ILLINOIS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ILLINOIS 
[May - , 1986] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented by this case is whether the pro-
ceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 
(Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., c~ are "criminal" 
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
against compulsory self-incrimination. 
Petitioner Terry B. Allen was charged by information in 
the circuit court of Peoria County with committing the crimes 
of unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault. Shortly 
thereafter the State filed a petition to have petitioner de-
clared a sexual dangerous person within the meaning of the 
Act. 1 After a preliminar.y hearing on the information, the 
criminal charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause, 
and the petition was apparently dismissed as well. Peti-
tioner was then recharged by indictment, and the petition to 
declare him sexually dangerous was reinstated. 
Pursuant to the Act, with petitioner and counsel present, 
the trial court ordered petitioner to submit to two psychiatric 
examinations; the court explained the procedure as well as 
' The Act defines sexually dangerous persons as follows: 
"All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has 
existed for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the fil-
ing of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensi-
ties to the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propen-
sities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children, 
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petitioner's rights under the Act, and petitioner indicated 
that he understood the nature of the proceedings. At the 
bench trial on the petition, the State presented the testimony 
of the two examining psychiatrists, over petitioner's objec-
tion that they had elicited information from him in violation of 
his privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court ruled 
that petitioner's statements to the psychiatrists were not 
themselves admissible, but allowed each psychiatrist to give 
his opinion based upon his interview with petitioner. Both 
psychiatrists expressed the view that petitioner was men-
tally ill and had criminal propensities to commit sexual as-
saults. Petitioner did not testify or offer other evidence at 
the trial. Based upon the testimony of the psychiatrists, as 
well as that of the victim of the sexual assault for which peti-
tioner had been indicted, the trial court found petitioner to be 
a sexually dangerous person under the Act. Consistent with 
the requirements of Illinois case law, see People v. 
Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 321-322, 343.N. E. 2d 28, -
(1976), the court made three specific findings: that at the time 
of trial petitioner had been suffering from a mental disorder 
for not less than one year; that he had propensities to commit 
sex offenses; and that by his actions he had demonstrated 
such propensities. · 
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District re-
versed, over one dissent. Relying on Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U. S. 454 (1981), the court held that the trial court had im-
properly relied upon testimony obtained in violation of peti-
tioner's privilege against self-incrimination. People v. Al-
len, 123 Ill. App. 3d 669 (1984). 2 
2 The appellate court interpreted the Act to require specific proof of 
more than one act of sexual assault. It therefore concluded that the the 
State had relied on the psychiatrists to make its entire case because the 
victim had only testified about one act. The Supreme Court of Illinois 
thereafter interpreted the Act to require proof of only one act, and con-
cluded that the victim's testimony was sufficient to satisfy the State's bur-
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The Supreme Court of Illinois unanimously reversed the 
appellate court and reinstated the trial court's finding that 
petitioner was a sexually dangerous person. It held that the 
privilege against self-incrimination was not available in sexu-
ally dangerous person proceedings because they are "essen-
tially civil in nature," the aim of the statute being to provide 
"treatment, not punishment." People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 
91, -, 481 N. E. 2d 690, 694, 695 (1985). The court also 
found support for its ruling in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U. S. 319 (1976). Observing that the State's interest in 
treating, and protecting the public from, sexually dangerous 
persons would be "almost totally thwarted" by allowing those 
persons to refuse to answer questions posed in psychiatric in-
terviews, and that the privilege "would be of minimal value in 
assuring reliability," the court concluded that "due process 
does not require the application of the privilege." 107 Ill. 
2d, at --, 481 N. E. 2d, at 696. Finally, the court held 
that "a defendant's statements to a psychiatrist in a compul-
sory examination under the provisions here involved may not 
be used against him in any criminal proceedings." Id., at 
--, 481 N. E. 2d, at 696. We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 
--, and now affirm. 
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
which applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), provides that no 
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." This Court has long held that the 
privilege against self-incrimination "not only permits a per-
son to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal trial in 
· which he is a defendant, but also 'privileges him not to an-
swer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, 
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.'" 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420. 426 (1984) (quoting 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973)); McCarthy v. 
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Supreme Court ruled that a person whom the State attempts 
to commit under the Act is protected from use of his com-
pelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in which he is 
the defendant. What we have here, then, is not a claim that 
petitioner's statements to the psychiatrists might be used to 
incriminate him in some future criminal proceeding, but in-
stead his claim that because the sexually dangerous person 
proceeding is itself "criminal," he was entitled to refuse to 
testify at all. 
The question whether a particular proceeding is criminal 
for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is first of all 
a question of statutory construction. See · United States v. 
Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980); One Lot Emerald Cut 
Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232, 236-237 (1972). 
Here, Illinois has expressly provided that proceedings under 
the Act "shall be civil in nature," ,i 105-3.01, indicating that 
when it files a petition against a person under the Act it in-
tends to proceed in a nonpunitive, noncriminal manner, 
"without regard to the procedural protections and restric-
Uons available in criminal prosecutions." Ward, supra, at 
249. As petitioner correctly points out, however, the civil 
label is not always dispositive. Where a defendant has pro-
vided "the clearest proof" that "the statutory scheme [is] so 
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] 
intention" that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered 
criminal and the privilege against self-incrimination must be 
applied. Id., at 248-249. We think that petitioner has 
failed to provide such proof in this case. 
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the Act ar.id its own 
case law and concluded that these proceedings, while similar 
to criminal proceedings in that they are accompanied by 
strict procedural safeguards, are essentially civil in nature. 
107 Ill. 2d, at--, 481 N. E. 2d, at 694-695. We are unper-
suaded by petitioner's efforts to challenge this conclusion. 
Under the Act, the State has a statutory obligation to pro-
vide "care and treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dan-
-
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gerous] designed to effect recovery,"~ 105-8, in a facility set 
aside to provide psychiatric care, ibid. 3 And "[i]f the patient 
is found to be no longer dangerous, the court shall order that 
he be discharged."· ~ 105-9. While the committed person 
has the burden of showing that he is no longer dangerous, 4 he 
may apply for release at any time. Ibid. 5 In short, the 
State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for 
the treatment of those it commits, and established a system 
under which committed persons may be released after the 
briefest time in confinement. The Act thus does not appear 
to promote either of "the traditional aims of punishment-
retribution and deterrence." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marti-
nez, 372 U. S. 144, 168 (1963). Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 
U. S. 418, 428 (1979) (in Texas "civil commitment state 
power is not exercised in a punitive sense"); French v. Black-
burn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-1359 (MDNC), aff'd mem., 443 
U. S. 901 (1979) (state need not accord privilege against self-
incrimination in civil commitment proceeding). 
Petitioner offers several arguments in support of his claim 
that despite the apparently nonpunitive purposes of the Act, 
it should be considered criminal as far as the privilege against 
self-incrimination is concerned. He first notes that the State 
3 Under Illinois Department of Correction regulations, the progress of 
persons confined at such facilities is reviewed at least every six months by 
a staff psychiatrist, and a request for a review hearing may be made at any 
time. 8 Ill. Register 14501 (1984). 
• Even if he fails to meet his burden the committed person may nonethe-
less be conditionally released: 
"If the court finds that the patient appears no longer to be dangerous but 
that it is impossible to determine with certainty under conditions of institu-
tional case that such person has fully recovered, the court shall enter an 
order permitting such person to go at large subject to such conditions and 
such supervision by the Director as in the opinion of the court will ade-
quately protect the public." ~ 105-9. 
•The Act further provides that "[u]pon an order of discharge every out-
standing information and indictment, the basis of which was the reason for 




ALLEN v. ILLINOIS 
-
cannot file a sexually dangerous person petition unless it has 
already brought criminal charges against the person in ques-
tion. ,r 105-3. In addition, the State must prove that the 
person it seeks to commit perpetrated "at least one act of or 
attempt at sexual assault or sexual molestation." People v. 
Allen, 107 Ill. 2d, at--, 481 N. E. 2d, at 697. To peti-
tioner, these factors serve to distinguish the Act from other 
civil commitment, which typically is not tied to any criminal 
charge and which petitioner apparently concedes is not "crim-
inal" under the Self-Incrimination Clause. Transcript of 
Oral Argument 24. We disagree. That the State has cho-
sen not to apply the Act to the larger class of mentally ill per-
sons who might be found sexually dangerous does not some-
how transform a civil proceeding into a criminal one. And as 
the State points out, it must prove more than just the com-
mission of a sexual assault: the Illinois Supreme Court, as we 
noted above, has construed the Act to require proof of the ex-
istence of a mental disorder for more than one year and a pro-
pensity to commit sexual assaults, in addition to demonstra-
tion of that propensity through sexual assault. See supra, 
at--. 
The discussion of civil commitment in Addington, supra, in 
·which this Court concluded that the Texas involuntary com-
mitment scheme is not criminal insofar as the requirement of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is concerned, fully supports 
our conclusion here: 
"[T]he initial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding is 
very different from the central issue in either a delin-
quency proceeding 0r a criminal prosecution. In the lat-
ter cases the basic issue is a straightforward factual 
question-did the accused commit the act alleged? 
There may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment 
proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the 
beginning of the inquiry. Whether the individual is 
mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others 
and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning 
-
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of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychi-
atrists and psychologists." 441 U. S., at 429 (emphasis 
in original). 
While here the State must prove at least one act of sexual as-
sault, that antecedent conduct is received not to punish past 
misdeeds, but primarily to show the accused's mental condi-
tion and to predict future behavior. People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 
2d, at-, 481 N. E. 2d, at 697. 
In his attempt to distinguish this case from other civil com-
mitment, petitioner places great reliance on the fact that pro-
ceedings under the Act are accompanied by procedural safe-
guards usually found in criminal trials. In particular, he 
observes that the Act provides an accused with the right to 
counsel, ,i 105-5, the right to demand a jury trial, ibid., and 
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, People v. 
Nastasia, 19 Ill. 2d 524, -, 168 N. E. 2d 728, 731 (1960). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trier of fact must deter-
mine whether the prosecution has proved the person's sexual 
dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. ,i 105-3.01; Peo-
ple v. Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N. E. 2d 28 (1976). But 
as we noted above, the State has indicated quite clearly its 
intent that these commitment proceedings be civil in nature; 
its decision nevertheless to provide some of the safeguards 
applicable in criminal trials cannot itself turn these proceed-
ings into criminal prosecutions requiring the full panoply of 
rights applicable there. See People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 
301, 304, 201 N. E. 2d 455, - (1964). 
Relying chiefly on In re Gault , 387 U. S. 1 (1967) , peti-
tioner also urges that the proceedings in question are "crimi-
nal" because a person adjudged sexually dangerous under the 
Act is committed for an indeterminate period to the Menard 
Psychiatric Center, a maximum security institution that is 
run by the Illinois Department of Corrections and that 
houses convicts needing psychiatric care as well as sexually 
dangerous persons. Whatever its label and whatever the 
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is the sort of punishment-total deprivation of liberty in a 
criminal setting-that Gault teaches cannot be imposed ab-
sent application of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
We believe that Gault is readily distinguishable. 
First, that casrs;weeping statement that "our Constitu-
tion guarantees that no person shall be 'compelled' to be a 
witness against himself when he is threatened with a depri-
vation of his liberty," id., at 50, is plainly not good law. Al-
though the fact that incarceration may result is relevant to 
the question whether the privilege against self-incrimination 
applies, Addington demonstrates that involuntary commit-
ment does not itselftrigger tlreentire range of criminal pro-
cedural protect10ns. lndeecf,' petitToner apparently concedes 
that traditional civil commitment does not require application 
of the privilege. Only two Terms ago, in Minnesota v. Mur-
phy, 465 U. S. 420, 435, n. 7 (1984) , this Court stated that a 
person may not claim the privilege merely because his an-
swer might result in revocation of his probationary status. 
Cf. Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 37 (1976) ("fact that a 
proceeding will result in loss of liberty does not ipso facto 
mean that the proceeding is a 'criminal prosecution' for pur-
poses of the Sixth Amendment"). 
The Court in Gault was obviously persuaded that the State 
intended to punish its juvenile offenders, observing that in 
many states juveniles may be placed in "adult penal institu-
tions" for conduct that if committed by an adult would be a 
crime. 387 U. S. , at 49-50. Here, by contrast, the State 
serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually 
~
dangerous persons by committing them to an institution ex-
press! desi ned to rov1 s c ri care an r nt. 
That the Menard Psychiatric Center houses not only sexually 
dangerous persons but also prisoners from other institutions 
who are in need of psychiatric _treatment does not transform 
the State's intent to treat into an intent to punish. 6 Nor 
6 To the extent that petitioner suggests that the conditions at the 
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does the fact that Menard is apparently a maximum security 
facility affect our analysis: 
"The state has a legitimate interest under its parens pa-
triae powers in providing care to its citizens who are un-
able because of emotional disorders to care for them-
selves; the state also has authority under its police 
power to protect the community from the dangerous ten-
dencies of some who are mentally ill." Addington, 
supra, at 426. 
Illinois' decision to supplement its parens patriae concerns 
with measures to protect the welfare and safety of other citi-
zens does not render the Act punitive. 
Our conclusion that proceedings under the Act are not 
"criminal''71/Rhrn the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's ---guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination does not 
completely dispose of this case. Petitioner rather obliquely 
suggests that even if his commitment proceeding was not 
criminal, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due 
process nonetheless required application of the privilege. In 
particular, petitioner contends that the Illinois Supreme 
Court "grossly miscalculated" in weighing the interests set 
out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). This 
Court has never held that the Due Process Clause of its own 
~erequTresappli~~mi-
nation ina"noncnminal roceeding, where t e pnv1 ege 
claimant is protected against his compelled answers in any 
subsequent criminal case. We decline to do so today. 
We think that the parties, and to some extent the Supreme 
Court of Illinois, have in their reliance on . Mathews v. 
Eldridge misconceived that decision. Mathews dealt with 
the procedural safeguards required by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment before a person might be de-
state's professed interest in treatment, thereby rendering committment 
proceedings under the Act "criminal," we note that this suggestion is sim-
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prived of property, and its focus was on such safeguards as 
were necessary to guard against the risk of erroneous depri-
vation of property. As the Supreme Court of Illinois and the 
State have both pointed out, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to see how requiring the privilege against self-incrimination 
in these proceedings would in any way advance reliability. 
Indeed, the state takes the quite plausible view that denying 
the evaluating psychiatrist the opportunity to question per-
sons alleged to be sexually dangerous would decrease the reli-
ability of a finding of sexual dangerousness. As in 
Addington, "to adopt the criminal law standard gives no as-
surance" that states will reach a "better" result. 441 U. S., 
at 430-431. 
The privilege against self-incrimination enjoined by the 
Fifth Amendment is not designed to enhance the reliability of 
the fact-finding determination; it stands in the Constitution 
for entirely independent reasons. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 
U. S. 534, 540-541 (1961) (involuntary confessions excluded 
"not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but be-
cause the methods used to extract them offend an underlying 
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is 
an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system"). Just as in 
a "criminal case" it would be no argument against a claim of 
the privilege to say that granting the claim would decrease 
the reliability of the fact-finding process, the privilege has no 
place among the procedural safeguards discussed in Mathews 
v. Eldridge, which are designed to enhance the reliability of 
that process. 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Illinois pro-
ceedings here considered were not "criminal" within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, and that due process does not independently re-
quire application of the privilege. Here, as in Addington, 
"the esser& of federalism is that states must be free to de- c__./ 
velop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into 
a common, uniform mold" of the sort urged by petitioner. 
• -
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441 U. S. , at 431. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Illinois is therefore 
Affirmed. 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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,_upi-tmt <ijomt d tl{t ~ttb ~tatts 
..-u.fringhtn. ~. (ij. 20~'!, 
May 22, 1986 
Re: 84-5404 - Allen v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
✓ 
As soon as I can get to it, I shall prepare a 
dissent in this case. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
-
~u:vrtnu- (qourt of tqt ~b ~taus 
'Bae!fingurn. ~- (q. 2llp~~ 
✓ 
May 22, 1986 
Re: No. 85-5404 - Allen v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
I await the dissent. 
Justice Rehnquist 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: May 27, 1986 
RE: Allen v. Illinois, No. 85-5404 
I have looked at your draft letter to WHR in this 
case, and have only one substantive comment. Your letter 
suggests that this case might come out differently if the 
record showed that the authorities gave identical 
treatment to { i) the convicted felons assigned to Menard 
Psychiatric Center and {ii) "sexually dangerous persons" 
also assigned to Menard. My own view is that the critical 
comparison is between "sexually dangerous persons" and -- -- - --, 
felons assigned to ordinary prisons--not those assigned to 
Menard. The difference might be important. For example, 
Illinois might provide that when prisoners develop mental 
problems, they should be taken out of prison and put in a 
"non-punitive" environment similar to the one that civilly 
committed persons face. It would not make sense, in my 
view, for such a humane gesture to lead to a decision that 
the civilly committed persons are "criminally" confined 
because they are housed together with prisoners. 
\ - - 2. 
In sum, I think the focus should be on whether 
sexually dangerous persons live in the same kind of 
environment that a normal felon faces in a normal 
"punitive" prison. 
changes along these 
I've suggested a couple of language 
lines (including a reference to 
Gault), and I've attached a revised version of the letter 
with the changes incorporated. (I've also attached the 
copy of your draft that you gave me.) 
- -
May 27, 1986 
85-5404 Allen v . Illinois 
Dear. Bi 1 l : 
The most troublesome aspect of this c~se, at least for 
me, is p~titioner's argument that the nature of the facility 
to which he was sentenced resulted in his fftreatment" beina 
the functional equivalent of "nunishment". The state con-
ceded at oral argument that the Menard Psychiatric Center is 
located within a large maximum-security Prison co~plex~ and 
contains a large number of persons convicted of ser ious fel-
onies. It also conceded, as l recall, that Person~ like 
petitioner ("sexua l,lv dangerou~ oersqnc:;") were co11fiT1e'1 in 
the same type cells as thesp. felons, and took their me~ls 
with them. 
These facts alone rnav not be enough to makP this 
"criminal." case, but if thP ~ecord fullv supported the view 
that there is no differencP in the way "sexually dangerous 
personsft and ordinarv felons are treated in other prison~, 
this woul~ bP a much closer ~all for roP. Your nntPion, qpp 
pp. 8-9, ~isn0ses of t~is isoue r~t~er briefly. It woul~ 
help m~ if your ooinion recognized that if t~e co~finem~nt 
of t'.e two cc1tPqrn·iec; ic; i~~!!tic.:11 exc~ot tl1:1t :1 "sexuallv 
dangerous persorft is entitled to have his status revicwcCT 
every six months, we wouJ~ hav~ 3 ~if~erent ca~e--one t~at 
would nerhaps be controlled bv In r~ CauJt. Here, as vou 
footnote p. 6 states, the recnr1 is inaiequate. It tcLls us 
little or nothing about t~e daily r~qim~~ at Menara, o• 
whethPr t~ 0 re are in fact relPvant di~ferences in the con-
finewent there and confinement of felons in ot~er state 
prisons . 
If you prefer not to incJuAe l?nguaqe along the forego-
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C H AMBERS OF 
J UST ICE W I LLIAM H. REH N QUIST 
-1-. 
May 28, 1986 
Re: No. 85-5404 Allen v. Illinois 
Dear Lewis, 
I think I understand what you were driving at in your 
letter of May 27th; would it satisfy you if I deleted the 
present footnote 6 and substituted the following paragraph 
in the text following the first paragraph break on page 9? 
"Petitioner has not demonstrated, and the record 
does not suggest, that 'sexually dangerous 
persons' in Illinois are confined under conditions 
incompatible with the State's asserted interest in 
treatment. Had petitioner shown, for example, 
that the confinement of such persons imposes on 
them a regimen which is essentially identical to 
that imposed upon felons with no need for 
psychiatric care, this might well be a different 
case. But the record here tells us little or 
nothing about the regimen at the psychiatric 
center, and it certainly does not show that there f ~ 
are no relevant differences between confinement -
there and confinement in the other parts of .11.~ u . 
maximum-security prison complex. Indee~, ~ounsel ~ l 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUST ICE W I LLIAM H . REHNQU IST 
May 28, 1986 
Re: No. 85-5404 Allen v. Illinois 
Dear Lewis, 
I think I understand what you were driving at in your 
letter of May 27th; would it satisfy you if I deleted the 
present footnote 6 and substituted the following paragraph 
in the text following the first paragraph break on page 9? 
"Petitioner has not demonstrated, and the record 
does not suggest, that 'sexually dangerous 
persons' in Illinois are confined under conditions 
incompatible with the State's asserted interest in 
treatment. Had petitioner shown, for example, 
that the confinement of such persons imposes on 
them a regimen which is essentially identical to 
that imposed upon felons with no need for 
psychiatric care, this might well be a different 
case. But the record here tells us little or 
nothing about t he regimen at the psychiatric 
center, and it certainly does not show that there f ~ 
are no relevant differences between confinem~~ ~ 
there and confinement in the other parts of At;:fl~~ . 
maximum-security prison complex. Indeed, counse1 /jf1 
for the State assures us that 6'-ider Illinois law ~ 
sexually dangerous persons must not be treated 
like ordinary prisoners. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-33. 
We therefore cannot say that the conditions of 
petitioner's confinement themselves amount to 
'punishment' and thus render 'criminal' the 
proceedings which led to confinement." 
Sincerely~ 
J ust i ce Powe ll 
- -
..§uprtmt (!timrll'f.flrt ~tb ..§tatts 
jl'a.qi:ttgbm. ~. (!t. 2llgi'l-' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
May 28, 1986 
Re: No. 85-5404 Allen v. Illinois 
Dear Lewis, 
I think I understand what you were driving at in your 
letter of May 27th: would it satisfy you if I deleted the 
present footnote 6 and substituted the following paragraph 
in the text following the first paragraph break on page 9? 
"Petitioner has not demonstrated, and the record 
does not suggest, that 'sexually dangerous 
persons' in Illinois are confined under conditions 
incompatible with the State's asserted interest in 
treatment. Had petitioner shown, for example, 
that the confinement of such persons imposes on 
them a regimen which is essentially identical to 
that imposed upon felons with no need for 
psychiatric care, this might well be a different 
case. But the record here tells us little or 
nothing about the regimen at the psychiatric 
center, and it certainly does not show that there 
are no relevant differences between confi nemen t -
t here and confi nement in the other parts of the 
maximum-security prison complex. Indeed, counsel 
for the State assures us that under Illinois law 
sexually dangerous persons must not be treated 
like ordinary prisoners. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-33. 
We therefore cannot say that the conditions of 
petitioner's confinement themselves amount to 
'punishment' and thus render 'criminal' the 
proceedings which led to confinement." 
Sincerely~ 
"1 VJ? f, 'lL ?vw-J I : 
~Lu1 fnroiul p~•a.~a.plt ,'tu '-I e..li~ { su_ f4u_ ~~ -~oi-i-✓<­
wA.wl- ~6nc), i.J- ,f- p:f1 _ -flu. p,,;J- a.e.roH. I ,ea,,,,..........,Qj'"' J-..,·.,_ 
Justice Powell 5 u.bje__L~ to fB.;_ ! ~r · 
~-# 
- -
May 29, 1986 
85-5404 Allen v. Illinois 
Dear Bili: 
PleasP ioin me. 
Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
- -
,jqrtntt Q+1tttd cf t4t ~ittb ~bdtll' 
Jht~lfutgton, ~. (q. 2llpJ!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUST ICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
June 4, 1986 
Re: 85-5404 Allen v. Illinois 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
✓ 
CHAMl!IERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -
~ltpTmtt Q1Mttt of tlft~b ~tatts 
Jfufying-ht~ ~- (ij. 2llp~~ 
June 7, 1986 
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